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prosecution of industrial incidental take created a glaring split of authority among U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, with one side applying strict liability to unintentional bird deaths resulting from industrial activities, limited only by proximate cause, 8 and the other refusing to apply the MBTA to indirect and unintentional deaths that are outside the MBTA's original scope of prohibited conduct-hunting and poaching. 9 The resulting circuit split has led to confusion for the FWS, industry, and lower courts. 10 Congress should end the confusion by amending the MBTA to authorize an incidental take program, which would allow limited unintentional killings of protected birds upon approval of the FWS. This would provide the clarity that the FWS, industry, and courts require, provide industry with certainty concerning liability and project planning, and provide the best balance between the MBTA's conservation principles and the reality that certain industrial operations inevitably kill protected birds. It would enable the FWS to ensure conservation of migratory birds, while still allowing the FWS to prosecute companies that fail to obtain a permit or violate the Act in some other way.
This article proceeds in three sections. Part I provides the historical backdrop of the MBTA, details the underlying treaties, and illustrates the functional operation of the Act. Part II reviews the varying judicial interpretations of the Act. 11 In Part III, the article considers options to solve the current MBTA confusion, including (1) congressional redefinition of MBTA take, (2) congressional authorization of an incidental take permit program, and (3) FWS implementation of an incidental take permit program without explicit congressional authorization. 12 The article concludes that a congressionally-authorized incidental take permit program would best solve the current confusion surrounding the application and scope of the MBTA. 13 in Wyoming. Id. As a result, the company agreed to pay $1 million in fines and develop an environmental compliance plan to prevent bird deaths at its other wind farms. Id. 8. See infra notes 149-182 and accompanying text (outlining the strict liability approach to the MBTA).
9. See infra notes 127-148 and accompanying text (highlighting the narrow interpretation of MBTA take).
10. See infra notes 203-205 and accompanying text (emphasizing the confusion created by the circuit split and the expansion of the MBTA).
11. 
I. THE MBTA: HISTORY, TREATIES, AND OPERATION

A. Historical Backdrop
The MBTA arose in a time of booming commercial trade in and recreational hunting of animals.
14 The 1800s ushered in an expanding frontier economy accompanied by sprawling population growth creeping through the American West. 15 It was the overhunting (and the near extinction) of bison that alerted many in the U.S. to the vulnerability of those species that were subject to commercial hunting. 16 However, overhunting extended far beyond bison to all species of ungulates, large predators, beaver, fish, sea cows, 17 and migratory birds.
18
Frontier hunters harvested birds to provide for lavish clothing decoration and exotic table-fare in metropolitan restaurants. 19 Hunting for culinary purposes destroyed the Labrador Duck population, causing it to disappear from New England meat markets after 1875. 20 However, the killing extended well beyond hunting for food. 21 The expansion of commercial hunting operations for recreation, feathers, and other bird 17. Id. at 9-10 ("Steller's sea cow, the only member of its genus and the largest of all sirenians, was slaughtered into extinction from 1741 to 1768 by Vitus Bering's stranded crew and subsequent visitors to Bering Island.").
18. See id. at 10 (outlining America's increasing awareness of losing species, especially birds).
A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of the United States for Protecting
Migratory Birds, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/ treatlaw.html (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Protecting Migratory Birds] ("By the late 1800s, the hunting and shipment of birds for the commercial market (to embellish the platters of elegant restaurants) and the plume trade (to provide feathers to adorn lady's fancy hats) had taken their toll on many bird species.").
20. CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note 15, at 10; EDWARD HOWE FORBUSH ET AL., A HIS-TORY OF THE GAME BIRDS, WILD-FOWL AND SHORE BIRDS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND ADJACENT STATES 416 (Wright and Potter 1912) ("The last Labrador Duck of which we have record died by the hand of man near Long Island, New York, in 1875 . . . .").
21. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178 ("The game business also drove other species, such as the heath hen, golden plover, and Eskimo curlew, to the brink of extinction by 1890.").
products, along with improvements in firearms, led to an increase in the number of hunters and the size of the harvests. 22 The dramatic impact commercial hunting had on bird populations is best illustrated by the demise of the passenger pigeon. 23 By ornithologists' estimates, the passenger pigeon once represented the most abundant species of bird on Earth. 24 In the late 1700s to early 1800s, the father of American ornithology, Alexander Wilson, estimated the size of one flock of passenger pigeons to be 240 miles long and a mile wide.
25 By Wilson's calculations, the flock "contain[ed] two billion, two hundred and thirty million, two hundred and seventy-two thousand pigeons." 26 Other bird observers echoed Wilson's astonishment at the staggering amount of passenger pigeons in America's skies: "They say that when a flock of passenger pigeons flew across the countryside, the sky grew dark. The air rumbled and turned cold. Bird dung fell like hail. Horses stopped and trembled in their tracks, and chickens went in to roost." 27 But despite the passenger pigeon's original abundance, the intensity of commercial hunting drove the species to extinction in the span of less than three decades. 28 The last known passenger pigeon, named Martha, died on September 1, 1914 in the Cincinnati Zoo. 29 Public outrage against commercial hunting began to reach to Congress. 30 The first earnest attempt to stop the wholesale slaughter culminated in the Lacey Act of 1900. 31 The Lacey Act sought to prevent interstate and international transportation of illegally killed or captured birds, curb the decline of domestic birds, and prevent the introduction of 23. PRICE, supra note 22, at 5 (" [T] he extinction [of the passenger pigeon] finally persuaded many Americans that the continent's wildlife was finite and that much of it had been destroyed.").
24. FORBUSH, supra note 20, at 433 ("Once the most abundant species, in flights and on its nesting grounds, ever known in any country, ranging over the greater part of the continent of North America in innumerable hordes, the race seems to have disappeared within the past thirty year, leaving no trace.").
25. McCullagh, 221 F. at 294 ("Unless a departure, as radical in theory as it is important in its effects, is to be made from fundamental principles long established by our laws, and long acquiesced in by our people, the act in question must be held incapable of support by any provision of the organic law of our county."); Shauver, 214 F. at 160 ("The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional.").
42 
The Canada Treaty
The first treaty went into effect in 1916 between the United States and Great Britain. 51 The parties sought to save birds migrating between Canada and the United States from "indiscriminate slaughter" and to preserve birds "useful to man." 52 Without adequate protection, the parties feared imminent extinction of useful bird species.
53
In 1995, Canada and the United States reformed the original treaty to reflect growing considerations of indigenous peoples' hunting rights and to better manage and protect migratory birds. 54 The 1995 Protocol replaced the majority of the original treaty's provisions. 55 It reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the long-term conservation of migratory birds and the need to regulate take of migratory birds. 56 The 1995 Protocol thus anticipates that some degree of take coincides with migratory 48 57 Specifically, the 1995 Protocol states: "Subject to laws, decrees or regulations . . . , the taking of migratory birds may be allowed at any time of the year for scientific, educational, propagative, or other specific purposes consistent with the conservation principles of this Convention." 58 The phrase "other specific purposes" presents potentially unlimited take circumstances, but any authorized take must comply with the 1995 Protocol's conservation principles. 59 The 1995 Protocol grants the authority to the respective parties to accomplish the conservation goals through "monitoring, regulation, enforcement and compliance." 60 The conservation principles, however, represent somewhat broad goals for the protection of migratory birds. 61 The 1995 Protocol enumerates five conservation principles: (1) management of migratory birds internationally, (2) guaranteeing various sustainable uses, (3) protecting healthy bird populations for harvesting, (4) protecting necessary bird habitat, and (5) restoring diminished bird populations. 62 Ultimately, any taking must not further accelerate the decline of protected birds or destroy necessary habitat. 63 Otherwise, the 1995 Protocol affords the parties and their respective implementing agencies the freedom to regulate take in accordance with the conservation principles. 
The Mexico Treaty
The United States entered into the next migratory bird treaty in 1937 with Mexico. 65 The Mexico Treaty declares the protection of migratory birds to be "right and proper . . . in order that the species may not be exterminated." 66 The treaty further declares the necessity of employing adequate measures in order to "permit a rational utilization of migratory birds for the purposes of sport as well as for food, commerce and indus-57. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 9 ("Thus, the protocol specifically contemplates the regulation of take of migratory birds.").
58. 68 Further, the Mexico Treaty only requires the parties to address take by establishing closed hunting seasons and potential take-free refugee zones, and banning the killing of insectivorous birds. 69 Outside of these requirements, the Mexico Treaty allows the parties to regulate take of birds so long as the parties prevent the extermination of the species. 
The Japan Treaty
The United States and Japan signed the next MBTA treaty in 1972. 71 The Japan Treaty recognizes that "birds constitute a natural resource of great value for recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and economic purposes, and that this value can be increased with proper management."
72 Accordingly, the parties agreed to cooperate in managing, protecting, and preventing the extinction of select birds. 73 The Japan Treaty specifically prohibits the taking of migratory birds except in enumerated circumstances. 74 In language very similar to the 1995 Protocol, the Japan Treaty allows take "[f]or scientific, educational, propagative or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention." 75 The Japan Treaty lacks a specific statement of the objectives. 76 However, the Proclamation section of the treaty asserts a desire "to cooperate in taking measures for the management, protection, and prevention of the extinction of certain birds." 77 In the broadest sense, the Japan Treaty au- 76. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 11. 77. Japan Treaty, supra note 71, at art. III(1)(a), *1; HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 11 (theorizing that the objective of the Japan Treaty is to prevent the extinction of certain species of birds).
thorizes take so long as it does not pose an extinction risk to bird species covered by the treaty. 
The Russia Treaty
The United States entered into the final MBTA treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1976. 79 In language similar to the Japan Treaty, the Russia Treaty declares the importance of migratory birds as "a natural resource of great scientific, economic, aesthetic, cultural, educational, recreational and ecological value and that this value can be increased under proper management." 80 The parties recognized the importance of implementing protective measures to curb threats to certain bird species.
81 Accordingly, the parties desired to "cooperate in implementing measures for the conservation of migratory birds and their environment . . . ." 82 The Russia Treaty specifically forbids the taking of migratory birds, except "for scientific, educational, propagative, or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this Convention." 83 The treaty lacks a specific declaration of its principles, but the term likely refers to the conservation of migratory birds and their environment. 84 Like the Japan Treaty, the Russia Treaty likely allows for take that comports with the conservation of protected species. 80. Russia Treaty, supra note 79, at Convention, *1; see Japan Treaty, supra note 71, at Proclamation, *1 (using wording substantially similar to the Russia Treaty declaring the value of migratory birds).
81 85 Accordingly, the statute uses broad language for what constitutes take. 86 The implementing language contains no explicit limitation that the MBTA applies only to hunting and trafficking. 87 The MBTA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the FWS, to issue regulations implementing the underlying treaties. 88 Today, these regulations protect nearly 850 species of birds, many of which are common species, like the crow. 89 The MBTA also contemplates that some form of authorized take of protected birds may be allowed under the treaties. [T]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed, from time to time, having due regard to the zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic value, breeding habits, and times and lines of migratory flight of such birds, to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the same, in accordance with such determinations, which regulations shall become effective when approved by the President.
The MBTA imposes misdemeanor and felony criminal penalties on the unauthorized take of protected birds. 91 Generally, in the context of industrial development, only the misdemeanor provision applies. 92 It subjects any person, association, or other business entity to a fine of not more than $15,000, imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both.
93
The U.S. Department of Justice may impose this fine for each violation, which can add up quickly in the context of large-scale industrial operations. 94 More troublingly for industrial operators, the misdemeanor penalties may apply without requiring that the violator has shown any culpable intent, 95 however, limits the MBTA's misdemeanor provisions to intentional actions directed at migratory birds. 98 The current circuit split creates confusion for the FWS, industry, and district courts in applying the MBTA.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MBTA
In the 1970s, the FWS began to extend MBTA prosecutions beyond the traditional realm of hunting and wildlife trafficking, and began to enforce the statute against accidental bird deaths caused by commercial and industrial operations. 99 The current MBTA court battles involve industrial operations that kill birds. 100 To date, the FWS has focused its prosecution of MBTA violations on a handful of industries: wastewater storage, 101 may be subject to prosecution under the MBTA, and indeed the first ever prosecution of a wind farm for violations of the MBTA occurred in late 2013. 105 In fact, many industry groups and critics of the MBTA claim the statute technically applies to any conduct that results in the death of a protected bird, 106 such as driving a car, owning a car, or even owning a home window into which a protected bird flies. 107 To limit the potentially absurd exposure that strict liability for MBTA violations entails, some courts began applying a proximate causation element to MBTA prosecutions. 108 The resulting state of MBTA case law presents a deep circuit division with conflicting precedent from numerous district courts, creating uncertainty among industrial companies and potentially the FWS. 106. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1182, 1186 (discussing MBTA defendants' arguments that the MBTA may apply to an unsuspecting motorist that kills a bird or to bird collisions with building windows); see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 89 at 2 (presenting data claiming window collisions kill "97 to 976 million birds annually" and cars account for "60 million" deaths a year).
107. birds" 118 then turned to the issue of intent. 119 FMC argued that it took no affirmative action to kill the birds and also had no intent to kill, 120 but the court rejected this argument by reasoning that FMC took an "affirmative act [when] it engaged in the manufacture of a pesticide known to be highly toxic," 121 then FMC "failed to act" when the chemical reached a pond where it could come into contact with protected birds. 122 The court analogized this reasoning to general principles of tort law and strict liability for toxic substances. 123 The court dismissed FMC's argument that it lacked knowledge of the bird deaths by pointing out that "the statute does not include as an element of the offense 'willfully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.'" 124 Ultimately, commentators and other courts criticized the Second Circuit's application of criminal strict liability based on tort principles. 125 However, FMC Corp. laid the groundwork as the first major circuit court decision upholding strict liability for industrial activities under the MBTA.
126
B. The Rogue Circuits
In the 1990s, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits each tackled incidental take stemming from another industrial activity-logging. 127 In Forest Service, environmental groups challenged the sale of logging permits, in part because the logging could potentially kill migratory birds. 128 The holding in Seattle Audubon Society represents the first major limitation on liability under the MBTA. Two Audubon societies challenged the sale of timber permits because the logging would destroy northern spotted owl habitat and thereby kill protected birds. 129 The court determined the definition of take in the MBTA and FWS regulations "describes physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute's enactment in 1918." 130 The court rejected the contention that the MBTA applied to "habitat modification or destruction." 131 In support of this position, the court compared the MBTA's definition of "take" to the same term used in Endangered Species Act (ESA).
132 When Congress enacted the ESA, it included the term "harm" in the definition of "take."
133 The FWS further defined ESA "harm" "to include habitat modification or degradation."
134 Therefore, the court reasoned, the ESA's definition encompassed a broader range of take than the MBTA, which does not include "harm" under the definition of take. 135 The court bolstered this conclusion by pointing out that Congress had not amended the MBTA after the enactment of the ESA to include the ESA's more expansive definition of "harm."
136
The court then turned to the holdings in FMC Corp. and United States v. Corbin Farm Services, which had applied the MBTA to industrial activities, pesticide wastewater ponds, and pesticide application respectively. 137 Even though these two cases applied the MBTA to the "direct, 149 The defendants were oil field operators in Kansas that used devices called "heater-treaters" at their well sites to separate contaminants (like water) from hydrocarbons.
150
Birds had a tendency to make nests inside heater-treater exhaust pipes and louvers. 151 After receiving a tip, the FWS inspected the heater-treaters of companies in the region and discovered roughly 300 dead birds, 10 of which the MBTA protected. 152 The FWS did not initially prosecute, but instead allowed the companies a "grace period" and began an education program aimed at preventing the bird deaths. 153 The campaign reached one of the operators but not the other.
154
After the public education program's grace period terminated, the FWS inspected the operators' equipment again. 155 The search yielded five dead birds that were protected by the MBTA. 156 This time, FWS prosecuted and the operators challenged the application of strict liability under the MBTA, as well as the statute's constitutionality on due process grounds.
157
The Tenth Circuit addressed the strict liability issue first. 158 The court established the MBTA's take provision lacked a mens rea requirement, using another Tenth Circuit case, Unites States v. Corrow, for support. 159 The necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge.'" 160 The court in Apollo interpreted Corrow's holding to mean that the MBTA's misdemeanor provisions lacked the need to establish "any particular state of mind or scienter," 161 noting also that Corrow followed seven other circuits at the time in applying strict liability to MBTA misdemeanor violations. 162 The operators argued their conduct was passive, and that, in the words of the court, "they merely failed to bird-proof the heater-treaters." 163 The operators sought for the court to apply the Eighth Circuit's holding in Newton, 164 but the Tenth Circuit rejected the application of Newton because the panel believed it only applied to adverse modification of bird habitat, rather than the clear take of protected birds. 165 The court thus definitively declared its stance on the MBTA: strict liability, period.
166
While the MBTA's scope, like any statute, can test the far reaches in application, we do not have that case before us. The question here is whether unprotected oil field equipment can take or kill migratory birds. It is obvious the oil equipment can. Simply put, the take and kill provisions of the Act are not outside the holding of Corrow.
167
The court then turned to the operators' constitutional challenge that the MBTA was a violation of due process. 168 The court distilled the operators' due process argument into two issues: an alleged lack of fair notice as to what conduct the statute prohibits, and the operators' alleged inability to know their actions would lead to the deaths of protected birds. 169 First, the court acknowledged that due process requires citizens be given fair notice of what conduct is criminalized by a statute. 170 The operators contended they were without notice of the conduct prohibited by the MBTA, 171 Addressing the second prong of the operators' constitutional challenge, the court also acknowledged that it is unconstitutional to criminalize acts that a defendant does not cause. 175 The second issue came down to whether the operators received "notice of predicate acts"-in this case, whether the operators knew their heater-treaters could kill migratory birds. 176 The court analogized notice to proximate causation: 177 We agree with the district court's assessment of proximate cause. Central to all of the Supreme Court's cases on the due process constraints on criminal statutes is foreseeabilitywhether it is framed as a constitutional constraint on causation . . . and mental state . . . , or whether it is framed as a presumption in statutory construction. When the MBTA is stretched to criminalize predicate acts that could not have been reasonably foreseen to result in a proscribed effect on birds, the statute reaches its constitutional breaking point.
178
Thus, the proximate cause issue rested on notice-whether the industry was on notice that its operations could kill birds. 179 The FWS had warned one of the operators about the risks heater-treaters posed, but had only notified the other operator after a charge had been filed. 180 The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed the convictions for which the FWS had provided notice, but overturned the one conviction of the operator that had not been notified that the heater-treaters could kill migratory birds. 181 Thus, the Apollo decision, as the most recent circuit court MBTA decision, stands for two important propositions: first, the MBTA misdemeanor provisions are strict liability offenses; second, a conviction under the MBTA requires a showing of proximate cause-essentially demonstrat- ing that the offender was on notice that his conduct may violate the MBTA.
182
D. The District Court Revolt
Despite the persuasiveness of Apollo, district courts have been reluctant to extend or follow its reasoning. 183 The most notable decision, United States v. Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P., comes from the District of North Dakota, in the Eighth Circuit. 184 In Brigham, the court was deciding on a motion to dismiss from three oil field operators who faced MBTA misdemeanors for dead birds found in wastewater reserve pits. 185 The court adopted a narrow reading of the MBTA's take prohibition that only encompassed intentional acts directed towards migratory birds.
186
The court ultimately declared that Congress did not intend to criminalize conduct "which may indirectly cause the death of birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act."
187
The court took the view that the MBTA's prohibition of take was limited to direct acts of bird killing, not indirect acts that caused accidental deaths.
188 "In the context of the Act, 'take' refers to conduct directed at birds, such as hunting and poaching, and not acts or omissions having merely the incidental or unintended effect of causing bird deaths." 189 The court turned to the dictionary definition of take and concluded, "the definition involves deliberate, not accidental, conduct. It refers to a purposeful attempt to possess wildlife through capture, not incidental or accidental taking through lawful commercial activity."
190 It further sup-182. Id.; see Robbins, supra note 126, at 601 ("The Apollo Energies court took the expectation that parties be on notice of the potential for regulation of their activities and twisted it into a requirement that the government provide individualized written notice of each particular risk of harm in order to hold the parties responsible for that harm."). The court also relied upon an unreported case from the District of New Mexico (Tenth Circuit) that was decided prior to Apollo. 193 In United States v. Ray Westall Operating, the district court declined to extend the MBTA to bird deaths in an oil and gas wastewater pond. 194 The Court finds that it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to impose criminal liability on every person that indirectly causes the death of a migratory bird. The Court concludes that Congress intended to prohibit only conduct directed towards birds and did not intend to criminalize negligent acts or omissions that are not directed at birds, but which incidentally and proximately cause bird deaths.
195
The Brigham court noted "reserve pits are not directed at birds or their habitat." 196 The court acknowledged the contrary precedent in other circuits set by FMC Corp. and Apollo, but adhered to the interpretation of Newton.
197
This Court expressly finds that the use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Like timber harvesting, oil development and production activities are not the sort of physical conduct engaged in by hunters and poachers, and such activities do not fall under the prohibitions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Newton C [ou] nty is controlling precedent which this Court is obligated to follow. Ultimately, the Brigham court found that if the MBTA were interpreted to encompass any conduct that proximately caused a bird death, the statute would impose liability on commonplace activities like pruning trees, reaping crops, driving a car, owning windows, or even owning a cat. 199 The court cited a 2002 FWS study on causes of bird mortality, which estimated 100 million to one billion birds were killed each year from collisions with building windows. 200 The court rejected the government's argument that all of these activities were open to prosecution under the MBTA.
201 "[T]he Government would have to criminalize driving, construction, airplane flights, farming, electricity and wind turbines, which cause bird deaths, and many other everyday lawful activities."
202
No clear consensus exists among commentators, FWS personnel, industry, or the courts on how to apply the MBTA. 203 The current MBTA atmosphere results in varying judicial approaches from circuit to circuit and from district to district. 204 The confusion creates an extremely difficult atmosphere for industry to operate within. 205 However, a solution 
III. AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL TAKE
Congress and the FWS should act to alleviate the confusion surrounding the MBTA. There are essentially two options for this. First, Congress could amend the statute, redefining the MBTA's take prohibition to specifically include or exclude incidental take. Second, Congress could authorize an incidental take permit program. Alternately, the FWS may be able to implement an incidental take permit program under its existing powers without congressional approval. The first option comes with significant political and administrative drawbacks, while the second option-an incidental take permit program-could be tailored to eliminate the confusion surrounding the MBTA without reducing the protective power of the MBTA.
A. Congressional Amendment to the MBTA
In an ideal political climate, the fastest and most effective option to provide certainty for the FWS and industrial operators rests with Congress. 206 Congress has two viable options to reform the MBTA to allow for incidental take. First, Congress can amend the statutory language of the MBTA to apply only to intentional takings. 207 This would result in more certainty as to whether industrial operators face liability, but the amendment may also place migratory birds in greater danger from inpermit mechanism to allow the incidental take of migratory birds as a result of natural gas pipeline construction activities, pipeline companies have no assurance they can abide by the Act and avert lawsuits."); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1209 ("[T]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion and lack of enforcement action by FWS and state agencies fails to provide wind farm operators with proper incentives to prevent or minimize wildlife impacts."); McKinsey, supra note 105, at 89 ("The uncertainty brought on by reliance on selective enforcement of the MBTA is perhaps the most difficult risk to precisely assess.").
206. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1210 ("Congress should amend the MBTA to grant incidental-take permits and require FWS to adopt regulations specifying the criteria for issuing such permits and standards for compliance with them.").
207. See Brunner, supra note 204, at 29-32 (discussing options to amend the statutory language of the MBTA to prevent confusion); McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91 (advocating for a statutory limitation of the MBTA's take definition to exempt wind farms).
creased industrial development, be it wind, oil and gas, transmission, pesticides, or even skyscraper construction. 208 Second, Congress can require the FWS to implement an incidental take permit program. 209 An incidental take program would allow the FWS to approve permits for a regulated number of bird deaths caused by permittees. Such a program would provide more protection to industry operators that accidentally kill protected birds, but it would also allow the FWS to regulate migratory birds deaths and provide for more effective mitigation measures. 210 There could be some disadvantages, however. Delays may result from an over-stretched FWS and a lack of manpower. The permit program could also prove too costly for some project managers, and some may opt to risk the chance of killing protected birds and potential MBTA prosecution. 211 Considering the relative merits of each system, the implementation of an incidental take permit program would best provide certainty to industry and uphold the conservation ideals of the MBTA and its implementing treaties.
Redefining "Take" to Exclude Incidental and Unintentional Actions
Congress could resolve the confusion in the circuits by simply clarifying the scope of the word "take."
212 The majority of redefinition proposals focus on exemptions for wind farms, but few call for exemptions for all other industrial operations. 213 For example, one commentator recommends the 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) take provision should read:
[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, excepting therein incidental harm or death to birds occurring from birds striking structures, including rotating or stationary 208. See Brunner, supra note 204, at 25 (suggesting that a statutory redefinition of take to exclude incidental commercial activities represents a fair and balanced approach to industrial take).
209. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1210 (arguing for congressional amendment authorizing incidental take).
210. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 2-3 (listing the benefits of an incidental take permit program including certainty, lack of lawsuits, habitat restoration, and conservation).
211. See id. at 37 (reasoning the incidental take permit program must be easy to implement to ease the workload on the FWS); Lurman, supra note 203, at 58 (discussing the difficulties posed to the FWS by implementing and managing a federal incidental take permit). Notably, the definition appears to only exempt wind farms and potential collisions with structures. 215 The scope of liability then turns on the definition of "structure."
216 Narrowly construed, "structure" might not cover oil reserve pits, 217 logging and logging permits, 218 electrocutions from transmission lines, 219 or bird deaths resulting from nesting in heatertreaters. 220 Certainly, the term "structure" will not cover deaths from pesticide applications, 221 or, at the logical extreme, cars and cats. 222 Therefore, while this proposed redefinition may encourage wind energy production, it does little to protect other industrial operators from MBTA liability. 223 Furthermore, this sort of narrow redefinition ineffectively addresses the larger ambiguities in the MBTA.
A broader redefinition of take-one that excludes liability for incidental bird killings more generally-would likely cure the MBTA's ambiguity, but it would also eviscerate the MBTA's protections against 214 223. Brunner, supra note 204, at 30 ("But McKinsey's language leaves open the likeliness that other industry-types incidentally killing migratory birds, such as oil companies and pesticides users . . . , would remain subject to the MBTA: oil pits and crop fields could incidentally lead to bird deaths, and these items do not expressly meet the characterization of a 'structure.'").
incidental activities that severely impact protected bird populations. For example, one commentator, in rejecting a narrow definition, suggests broader language:
It shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, excepting therein incidental harm or death to birds (1) occurring from birds striking structures reasonably designed to minimize such collisions, or (2) resulting from commercial or industrial operations unrelated to hunting, gaming, or poaching practices if the commercial or industrial operations are reasonably designed to minimize such harm or death to birds.
224
This redefinition would explicitly exempt wind farms and industrial operators from liability for incidental deaths. 225 However, the interjection of a "reasonable" standard may complicate future prosecution and subject the MBTA to further ambiguity. 226 For example, the number of bird fatalities caused by wind farms is often staggering. 227 Yet, from the perspective of proponents of wind development, the number of turbine collisions may seem reasonable, 228 while a lower number of bird deaths caused by oil reserve pits may not seem reasonable. 229 In either case, the environmental community would likely lobby strongly against such a broad redefinition of MBTA take and the FWS may oppose the amendment as well. 230 Furthermore, this sort of redefinition would likely jetti- (2010) (discussing bird mortality from direct collisions with wind farms using 2001 numbers based upon 15,000 operating wind turbines in the United States); Cappiello, supra note 223 (referencing a 2013 study placing the number of birds killed annually by wind farms at 573,000).
228. See McKinsey, supra note 105, at 90 ("The wind energy industry would emphasize that a bird killed for a megawatt-hour of renewable, non-foreign wind energy is much more acceptable than a bird killed for a unit of foreign[-]purchased or non-renewable energy.").
229. See id. 230. Id. at 90 ("Resolution to this conflict is perhaps stymied by the failure of an important ally to renewable energy, the environmental protection collective, to consider softening any environmental law."); see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 37 (discussing the FWS's belief that any regulatory take permit must "provide conservation benefits to, and protect, migratory birds").
son most of the MBTA's current protections that go beyond direct and intentional killings to conserve an already strained U.S. bird population. 231 Although the broad redefinition might provide certainty to industry, the diminished protections for migratory birds makes such a congressional amendment unlikely.
Congressionally Mandated Incidental Take Permit Program
Alternately, Congress could amend the MBTA and require the FWS to implement an incidental take permit program. This would have certain advantages over a program developed by the FWS under its own authority, as discussed below. Explicit congressional authorization of an incidental take program would prevent administrative obstacles that would arise in FWS rulemaking, including the foundational question of whether the FWS even has the power to authorize an incidental take program, without congressional approval, according to its delegation of authority under the MBTA. 232 Congress may also be able to authorize an incidental permit program more quickly than if the FWS were to create the program through its cumbersome rulemaking process. 233 Finally, congressional authorization would remove ambiguity and potential litigation over the validity of an incidental take program developed by the FWS. 234 Although congressional action presents the cleanest route to authorizing incidental industrial take, Congress has not taken action to implement such a broad program in the MBTA's 96-year history. trict Court for the District of Columbia held that live-fire military training exercises that killed protected birds violated the MBTA. 237 Finding this limitation on military preparedness unacceptable, Congress responded by authorizing the FWS, in conjunction with the military, to implement incidental take permits for military readiness activities. 238 The rule placed certain limitations upon the military's activities, including requiring mitigation, minimization, and monitoring of migratory bird take during the training exercises. 239 The FWS may issue permits authorizing incidental take to the extent the agency believes the take conforms with the MBTA and the original treaties' terms. 240 The military incidental take program could be used as a model for a broader incidental take program. The congressional conference report explicitly states that the military training incidental take permit amendment comports with the United States' treaty obligations underlying the MBTA, 241 and the FWS has acknowledged this. 242 Although these affirmations arise in the context of military training exercises because Congress and FWS believe that incidental take comports with the underlying trea-ties, the groundwork has been laid for subsequent amendments to MBTA incidental take. 243 Congress's finding that the killing of protected birds by military exercises is permissible under the MBTA shows Congress does not believe incidental take will breach the underlying treaties, which would subject the treaties to cancellation by the partner countries. 244 Therefore, the military training incidental take legislation and subsequent rulemaking has laid the groundwork for a broader revision to the MBTA allowing for general incidental take. 245 However, given the current political deadlock in Congress, congressional action may be unlikely and, even if attempted, untimely.
246
B. FWS Development of an Incidental Take Permit
If Congress declines to amend the MBTA, the FWS may be able to implement an incidental take permit program on its own. Although the regulatory process may take longer than congressional action, there is authority for the FWS to implement a general incidental take permit. 247 One industry group, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), issued a report arguing for the FWS to implement a "permit-by-rule" incidental take program 248 without waiting for explicit congressional authorization. 249 First, the INGAA study emphasizes that the MBTA confers authority on the Secretary of the Interior, through FWS, to "determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow . . . taking . . . of any [protected] bird . . . , and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the same."
250 Accordingly, the MBTA alone, without explicit congressional approval, allows FWS to regulate take of protected birds. 251 In fact, the FWS has already implemented narrow permits for direct and incidental take, 252 though none of the existing permits cover industrial incidental take. 253 As the INGAA study points out, the second consideration for a viable, FWS-implemented incidental take permit program is compatibility with the MBTA's underlying treaties. 254 Under those treaties, the incidental take permit program would contribute to the conservation of migratory birds and their habitat. 255 Three of the four treaties 256 allow take for "other specific purposes" consistent with the conservation of mi-gratory birds. 257 But these treaties limit those other purposes to "scientific, educational, [and] propagative" purposes. 258 The plain meaning of "other specific purposes" presents a potentially unlimited set of circumstances allowing take, 259 so long as the take comports with the treaties' conservation principles. An incidental take permit program for industrial activities hardly comports with science, education, or species propagation. Thus, a court could find industrial incidental take falls outside the "other specific purposes" for which the FWS may allow take.
Despite the potential for litigation, the FWS could build an incidental take program modeled on Congress's military exercises exception. In evaluating the narrower military training incidental take program, the FWS found that the program was compatible with the treaties. 260 The INGAA study argues the military training permit program paves the way for a broader incidental take program. 261 However, the study qualifies this conclusion: "Whether the Service's regulations implementing the program for incidental take by the Armed Forces are consis-tent with the Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Russia treaties was not tested in court and can no longer be challenged, but the Service believes them to be consistent."
262 If the FWS acts alone to undertake an incidental take program, the agency exposes itself to a challenge that it acted outside its congressionally granted authority, issued regulations inconsistent with the conservation principles of the underlying treaties, and interpreted the phrase "other specific purposes" too expansively. Therefore, although the FWS may be able to implement an incidental take program without congressional authorization, 263 the best option remains a congressional mandate for an incidental take program.
CONCLUSION
The MBTA arose out of the gun smoke of hunters and poachers who annihilated abundant migratory bird species across the United States.
264 Despite Congress's clear concern with hunting and poaching when it enacted the MBTA, the statute contains no explicit limitation on the type of conduct it covers. 265 The seemingly expansive MBTA language, and FWS enforcement of it, has now ensnared industrial activities originally outside the scope of the MBTA. 266 The FWS's expansion of liability under the MBTA to include incidental industrial take created a significant circuit split: one side applying strict liability to industrial activities limited only by proximate cause, 267 and the other refusing to apply the MBTA to indirect and unintentional take outside the original scope of hunting and poaching. 268 The divergent approaches created an atmosphere of confusion for the FWS, industry, and lower courts-confusion that requires congressional or FWS attention.
Without congressional intervention, the MBTA will continue to be stuck with varying interpretations from court to court, preventing the effective and uniform conservation of migratory birds. Congress can 262. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 703 (limiting judicial review of FWS regulations under the MBTA to 120 days after publication)) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 33. 264. See supra notes 14-35 and accompanying text (outlining the destruction of migratory birds caused by hunting and poaching at the turn of the twentieth century).
265. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing the original aim of the MBTA and how the language actually turned out).
266. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty courts have had in interpreting the MBTA's scope in regard to incidental take caused by industrial activities).
267. See supra notes 149-182 and accompanying text (outlining the strict liability approach to the MBTA).
268. See supra notes 127-148 and accompanying text (highlighting the narrow interpretation of MBTA take).
